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THE MEASURE OF COMPENSATION IN EMINENT
DOMAINBy CHARLES T. MCCORMICK*
1. THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ACTUALLY TAKEN: IMPROVE-

MENTS: VALUE TO THE TAKER

T

HE principal item of the "just compensation" which is required to be made when property is taken for public use is
the value of the property actually taken. In case of land, this
must include, of course, the value of all buildings, improvements,
trees and unmatured crops.' Fair market value of the land for its
highest and best available use is said to be the measure of compensation. 2 Consequently, while estimates directly of the value of
the property for any particular use are sometimes held to be incompetent,- yet evidence of the different advantageous uses to
which the property is adapted in its present condition is admissible, and likewise any use to which the property might be put in
the future ought to be considered, 4 if such use is sufficiently practicable and probable as to be likely to influence the price which a
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School, Chicago, Ill.
TThis article will appear as one of the chapters in an elementary text
book on Damages to be published by West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.
Valuable assistance in collecting the decisions and other material used in
preparation of the article was furnished by Mr. WV. S. Perlroth.
'Department of Public Works and Buildings v. McBride, (1930) 338
Ill. 347, 170 N. E. 295.
2Illinois Light & Power Co. v. Bedard, (1931) 343 Ill. 618; 175 N. E.
851; Matter of Niagara, Lockport & Ontario Power Co. v. Horton, (1931)
231 App. Div. 402, 247 N. Y. S. 761; Wood v. Wyoming County Court,
(1925) 100 W. Va. 29, 129 S. E. 747. See Decennial and Current Digests,
Eminent
Domain, sec. 131.
3
Weiser Valley Land & Water Co. v. Ryan, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1911) 190
Fed. 417, 422.
4Wassenich v. City and County of Denver, (1920) 67 Colo. 456, 186
Pac. 533.
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present purchaser would give for it.'

Thus, if farm land on the

borders of a city is to be valued, the fact that it could be profitably
subdivided into lots seems competent.' But remote and speculative
possibilities cannot be regarded.
A vexed and unsettled question which often arises, and which
cuts deep into problems of fundamental policy relating to the purpose and the extent of the law's protection of the claims and interests of property-owners, is the question of how far the special
fitness for public use of the property taken shall be considered in
arriving at the value of the property." In determining the "fair
market value" of the land shall the tribunal assume that the
"market" of hypothetical possible purchasers does or does not include the following: (1) purchasers who, before the present improvement was legally launched, were influenced by the possibility
that the property might in future be needed or condemned for the
present purpose; for example, for a railway, street, reservoir or
water-power development? (2) purchasers who are influenced by
the fact that the present project has actually been undertaken, and
that the land will probably or necessarily be taken in eminent domain? (3) the present condemnor who seeks to take the land by
eminent domain? Ultimately, the question seems to be: ought the
owner to be compensated specially because his property is specially
suitable to be used for a "public" purpose ? So far as the property
5

Ranck v. Cedar Rapids, (1907) 134 Ia. 563. 111 N. W. 1027, 1028
("all the facts which the owner would properly and naturally press upon
the attention of a buyer to whom he is negotiating a sale and all other fact,
which would naturally influence a person of ordinary prudence desiring t()
purchase").
6
Chicago, D. & C. R. Co. v. Simons, (1918) 200 Mich. 76, 166 N. V.
960; 20 C. J. 774 n. 90. Similarly, the fact that a house now used as a family residence is suitable for conversion into an apartment building. Bonaparte v. City of Baltimore, (1917) 131 Md. 80, Atd. 594. But the o\uner's intentions, as such, with respect to future use are immaterial. Board
of Education v. Heywood Mfg. Co., (1923) 154 Minn. 486, 192 N. W. 102.
Compare In re Inwood Hill Park, (1930) 230 App. Div. 41, 243 N. Y. S.
63, order of reversal affirmed, (1931) 256 N. Y. 556, 177 N. E. 138. In that
case a vacant suburban tract was sought to be condemned for park purpose,.
The owner offered in evidence a plan, prepared for purposes of the trial.
under which the tract would be developed for apartment house sites. There
was testimony that this was the most profitable use to which the land could
be devoted. The plan could only be effectuated if approved by the City
(the condemnor) to which it had never been submitted, but such approval
was unlikely. The trial court's exclusion of the plan was held erroneou,.
The decision is criticised in a comment in (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 308 as opening the
door to speculative possibilities of future enhancement.
7
Wassenich v. City & County of Denver, (1920) 67 Colo. 456, 186 Pac.
533; Petition of Dillman, (1931) 255 Mich. 152, 237 N. W. 552.
8
The decisions on the question are collected in Decennial & Current
Digests, Eminent Domain, sec. 134, 20 C. J. sec. 232.
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may be used by the owner himself or by others, for this purpose,
without exercising the power of eminent domain, this value seems
one which should be paid forY However, in many cases, this
power of eminent domain is essential to the utilization of the
owner's property for the purpose for which it is sought to be condemned. 10 Thus, a water reservoir site could ordinarily be devoted to this use only if the right to lay conduits to a city could
be compulsorily taken. A pass in the hills suitable for the laying
of a railway track could ordinarily be so used only by one who
could condemn a right-of--way to points beyond. Shall the fact that
possible buyers know that "just compensation" must be made if
the land, strategically situated for public use, is taken in eminent
domain, be allowed to enhance the measure of that "just compensation," in cases where the owner, if no eminent domain proceedings were possible, could use his land only for pasture or farm?
So far as this attitude of willingness to pay more is prompted by
the anticipation that a jury or commissioners in condemnation
would award more than the law warrants, the resulting "value,"
though genuine, should of course not be paid for.11 But the question remains what compensation is, or should be warranted by
law, where the land-owner, due to the strategic location of his
9
This seems to be the basis for the decision in Boom Co. v. Patterson.
(1878) 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206, which involved the valuation of three
islands in the Mississippi which were taken in eminent domain by a company
which was erecting a log-boom. The court said: "The position of the three
islands in the Mississippi fitting them to form, in connection with the west
bank of the river, a boom of immense dimensions, capable of holding in
safety over twenty millions of feet of logs, added largely to the value of the
lands. The boom company would greatly prefer them to more valuable
agricultural lands, or to lands situated elsewhere on the river; as, by utilizing them in the manner proposed, they would save heavy expenditures of
money in constructing a boom of equal capacity. Their adaptability for
boom purposes was a circumstance, therefore, which the owner had a right
to insist upon as an element in estimating the value of his lands. We do not
understand that all persons except the plaintiff in error were precluded from
availing themselves of these lands for the construction of a boom, either on
their own account or for general use."
'°The courts found that because of the scattered ownership of other
necessary lands, the power of eminent domain was essential to the utilization of the owner's property for reservoir purposes in the following cases:
McGovern v. N. Y., (1913) 229 U. S.363, 372, 33 Sup. Ct. 876, 877, 57 L.
Ed. 1228, 1232; New York v. Sage, (1915) 239 U. S. 57, 61, 36 Sup. Ct. 25,
60 L. Ed. 143; Medina Valley Irr. Co. v. Seekatz, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1916)
237 Fed. 805.
"Compare the following language in the Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913)
230 U. S.352, 451, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1151,
Ann. Cas. 1916A 18 (quoted by Hale, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 11): "It is
impossible to assume in making a judicial finding of what it would cost to
acquire the property, that the company would be compelled to pay more than
its fair market value."
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property, is in a position to demand and to receive, in a process of
bargaining, from the present taker an amount greater than any
purchaser would be willing to pay for the land for any other than
the "public" use for which it is being taken, and which no purchaser could effectively utilize for this "public" purpose except
through the aid of the governmental power to "take" by condemnation? If the land is essential, the maximum that the taker
would be willing to pay, if he had to, would be the largest amount
which would just stop short of rendering it more profitable to
abandon the whole enterprise than to pay; if not essential, then
the cost of other land which could be used as a substitute. In
either event, this may be greatly in excess of any price which the
owner could secure for the land from purchasers for private uses,
and in extreme cases would give him the advantages of a partnership in a public utility enterprise without any corresponding risk.'"
The minimum price which the seller would be willing to take would
be the best price which he could secure from other purchasers not
armed with the power of eminent domain.
A leading case 13 in the English Privy Council involves the expropriation, for purposes of an electric power development, of
certain islands in the rapids of the St. Lawrence River. 'The
islands were advantageous but not essential to the project. The
islands were first valued by arbitrators, who fixed the value at the
bare amounts for which the islands could be sold for agricultural
use. The lower court set this aside, and awarded sums which
seemed to be based upon the "value to the taker;" that is, the
maximum sums which the taker could afford to pay for the
islands. On appeal, the Privy Council held that neither of these
awards was sustainable, but that the owner should be given such
sum as he could probably have secured for the islands, in the
light of the situation as it existed before the present taker acquired the right to take the property; that is, ignoring the present
necessities of the taker, but considering the enhancement which
would come from the expectation that the islands might probably
12 This was pointed out in Gilmore v. Central Maine Power Co., (1929)
127 Me. 522, 145 Atl. 137, 138 (valuation of land overflowed by hydroelectric dam; value of the flowed land "for water power purposes," held,
not the proper criterion. "This theory, if adopted, would make the owner
of any land flowed in a hydro-electric development a quasi partner, entitled
to share in the value of the entire development without sharing in the
burden of its cost or the risk of its failure.")
13Cedar Rapids Mfg. & Power Co. v. La Coste, [1914] A. C. 569, 83
L. J. P. C. 162, 110 L. T. 873, 30 T. L. R. 293.
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be needed for such an enterprise. This position represents a compromise of the opposing contentions. The decision was followed
in England by a statute which in cases of property taken by
governmental agencies, as distinguished from privately owned
public utilities, decisively settles the matter by denying any recognition to claims for "special value." 14
In the United States the decisions seem to warrant the following conclusions:
1. That the compensation to be paid the owner is not measured
by the value of the property to the taker.1" That is, the owner is
not entitled to a proportionate share of the value of the completed
enterprise fixed by the degree to which his property contributes
to its success, nor to the amount which the taker would pay for
his property rather than abandon the enterprise. " It is to be
valued as of the time of the taking, but on the imaginary supposition that the market has not been affected by the fact that the
particular development has been undertaken.'2. The owner is, however, entitled to the highest value which
he could secure for his property in the market, including any increase in value which would result from the probability that, if
the present taker's enterprise had not been launched, other purchasers would give more for the land by reason oi their expectation that because of its stratetic situation it might be used in a
8

similar development.1
14(1919) 9 & 10 Geo. V, ch. 57, sec. 2 (3) : "The special suitability or
adaptability of the land for any purpose shall not be taken into account if
that purpose is a purpose to which it could be applied only in pursuance of
statutory powers, or for which there is no market apart from the special
needs of a particular purchaser or the requirements of any government
Department or any local or public authority ....
15 United States v. Chandler Dunbar Co., (1912) 229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup.
Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063; Gilmore v. Central Maine Power Co., (1929) 127
Me. 522, 145 Ati. 137; Emmons v. Utilities Power Co., (1928) 82 N. H.
181, 141 Atl. 65; Wadsworth v. Water Co., (1917) 256 Pa. St. 112, 100
At1. 577, Ann. C. 1917E 1099; State v. Okla. Ry. Co., (1931) 153 Oki. 76,
4 Pac. (2d) 1009.
'See Chelan Electric Co. v. Perry, (1928) 148 Wash. 353, 268 Pac.
1040, 1042; Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, (1892) 92 Cal. 531,
28 Pac. 681, 683.
17 See the instructions approved in Producers' Co. v. Commissioners,
(1928) 227 Ky. 159, 12 S. W. (2d) 292, 296; Spring Valley Water Works
v. Drinkhouse, (1892) 92 Cal. 531, 28 Pac. 681, per Harrison, J.. concurring. Contra: Ranck v. Cedar Rapids, (1907) 134 Iowa 563, 111 N. W.
1027.
8
City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, (1929) 96 Cal. App. 708, 275 Pac.
228 (hearing denied by Calif. Sup. Ct.) (full opinion, reviewing prior
cases); Emmons v. Utilities Power Co., (1928) 82 N. H. 181, 141 Atl. 65.
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3. By what is probably the prevailing view, this enhancement
of value by reason of the special fitness of the land for the public
use cannot be considered where it would be impracticable to utilize the property for this purpose, except by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain to secure other tracts necessary to coinplete the development. 9 Whether it would be impracticable is
frequently a difficult and speculative question, 20 and the appellate
or the other without
courts frequently assume an answer one way
21
disclosure of the basis for the assumption..
A recent writer points out, in a learned and illuminating article,2' 2 in which both the legal and the economic considerations are
thoroughly canvassed, that the whole question of the extent to
which "strategic" value should be paid for in eminent domain
involves a weighing of the conflicting interests of the land-owner
on the one side and of the tax-paying or rate-paying public, on
the other.3 He concludes that the results reached by our courts,
whereby "strategic" values, if they are such as would attract other
purchasers, must be paid for by the taker, are consistent with our
general economic practice with respect to the protection of property values without regard to whether they are created by sociall,
19The federal cases cited in n. 11, supra, lend support to this view.
"If there is conflict in the evidence as to practicability then the issue
is for the jury. Ford Hydro-Electric Co. v. Neely, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1926)
13 F. (2d) 361 (semble). But in the absence of evidence on the question,
should practicability be presumed, and evidence of special utility be admitted? The court in City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, (1929) 96 Cal. App.
708. 275 Pac. 228, seems to say yes, but in Medina Valley Irrigation Co. v.
Seekatz. (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1917) 237 Fed. 805 the court seem to place the
burden upon the proponent of such evidence.
2
See. for example, Matter of Niazara. Locknort & Ontario Power Co.
v. Horton, (1931) 231 App. Div. 402, 247 N. Y. S. 761.
22
Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. I.
-23Where property is taken by a tax-levying governmental body, such
as the state, a city, or a drainage district, the holding that "strategic" value
for the taker's purposes need not be paid for is reasonably sure to entire to
the benefit of the tax-payers. On the other hand, where the property has
been taken by a hydro-electric power company or by a railroad, which are
operated for the profit of the stockholders, the effectiveness of present
governmental control of rates is not such as to furnish any guaranty that
the saving will be reflected in the rates. The company would not be limited
to the amount actually paid for the property under the condemnation award.
but could demand that it be valued for rate-making purposes as part of the
going concern. This consideration, though not mentioned, may well influence some courts to be more liberal in awarding special-use value in cacs
involving such projects as privately owned power plants and irrigation damus,
than in cases involving such publicly owned conveniences as parks and
streets. Supposedly it must.have been influential in shaping the English
statute (supra. n. 14) which denies compensation for value to the taker,
only when the taking is by a governmental body.
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useful efforts. If in this instance the enhancement in market
value is to be denied recognition as a basis for compensation, because it is due solely to public needs and not to any efforts on the
owner's part, it should be done by the legislature, as in England.
He suggests, on the other hand, that where the land has a special
value to the taker by reason of improvements which have been
placed upon the land by the present owner, as where an abandoned
canal embankment is adapted to be used by a railway, this value,
contributed not by nature but by the owner's efforts, should be
paid for, to the extent of its cost, by the condemnor so far as it
24
is benefited.
2. SPECIAL VALUE TO THE OWNER OF LAND TAKEN, AND
DIMINUTION IN VALUE OF LAND RETAINED

If the owner has improved his land as a farm, or has placed a
store-building or apartment house upon it, obviously these improvements are proper to be considered as affecting the amount
which a purchaser would be willing to pay for it; that is, as
affecting its market value. The ordinary standard of market
value, where the whole tract is taken, is usually adequate in such
cases. But that standard-always a rather speculative and theoretical one as regards land-becomes even more tenuous where
the land taken has been devoted by the owner to uses which are
non-commercial or so highly specialized that such property is
only very rarely the subject of sale. Consequently. the problem
24
The value for railway purposes of an abandoned canal site was held
to be a proper element to be considered. Matter of N. Y. Lackawanna &
W. R. Co., (1882) 27 Hun (N.Y.) 116; See 20 C. J. 779, n. 8. Similarly,
the value to the taker of the graded roadbed of a railway constructed while
the land was leased by the condemnor was held to require consideration in
Charles v. Big Sandy & C. R. R. Co., (1925) 142 Va. 512, 129 S. E. 284.
It appeared, however, that the railway would have been valuable for the
landowner's uses also. In the recent case of Davenport v. Franklin County,
(1931) 277 Mass. 89, 177 N. E. 858 the abandoned site of an old interurban
railway was acquired by the county for a highway. The owner, who had
bought the roadbed from the receiver of the railway properties, proved in
the condemnation proceedings that the strip ran over a hillside and a
swamp, and that the hill had been cut through for the roadbed, and the
soil thus removed was used to fill in the swamp. The court held that the
obvious value for highway purposes of this cut and fill were not compensable, since they neither enhanced the usability of the land to the owner,
nor increased its marketability to persons other than the condemnor. Perhaps this result may be reconciled with the view that special value to taker
should be paid for when it has been added by the owner's labor or expenditure, upon the ground that here it was the former owner and not the present
one that had improved the land.
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of compensation is a special one where property is sought to be
condemned which is devoted to such uses as a cemetery, a church,
a college, a club-house, or a railway or steamship terminal. In
those cases the value to the owner must be generalized in terms of
what a hypothetical purchaser (a cemetery association, a church,
a college, etc.) having the same needs as the present owner would
be willing to pay if such a special purchaser could be found.2
In still another aspect, the value of the land taken to the owner
may be far greater than its ordinary market value. Usually the
taker does not require all of the owner's land, but only a strip
or part. This strip may be a vital and strategic part of a farm, a
factory-site, a base-ball park, or a warehouse. Obviously, the
owner values it, not as an isolated parcel, but as an integral part
of his whole property. It may have a value to him far greater
than to any ordinary purchaser. Usually, in fact, the strip taken
would, because of its very shape, have no market value, considered
alone, in the sense of having any general appeal to any large group
of potential buyers, and would not be usable at all except as part
of the particular type of public improvement contemplated, such
as a street, railroad, or drainage ditch. A recent Kentucky case20
offers a concrete illustration. A plant for creosoting railroad ties
and other timbers was situated on a tract of one hundred and
seventy acres on the outskirts of Louisville. A large area was
needed for drying the timbers. Only two units of the plant had
been installed, and two additional units were planned. To make
this possible, seventy acres of the tract were reserved at the outset for expansion. For the time being, this was used as a golf
course. The average cost of the tract as a whole, including the
cost of grading and drainage, was about nine hundred dollars per
acre. The entire plant with improvements was worth one million,
five hundred thousand dollars. The public authority now proceeds to condemn a strip across the tract about two hundred feet
wide and about nine acres in extent, following the former course
of a small stream, for an open sewer. The strip separates the
25
As examples of such cases, see the following: First Parish in Woburn
v. Middlesex County, (1856) 73 Mass. 106 (church) ; Idaho Western R.
Co. v. Columbia Conference, (1911) 20 Idaho 568, 119 Pac. 60, 38 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 497 (college campus) ; Sanitary District v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. &
C. R. Co., (1905) 216 Ill. 575, 75 N. E. 248 (railroad terminal) ; Re Canada S. S. Lines, Ltd. & Toronto Term. R. Co., (1930) 4 Dom. L. R. 626
(ship26 terminals).
Producers' Wood Preserving Co. v. Commissioners, (1928) 227 Ky.
159, 12 S. W. (2d) 292.
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main plant from the area reserved for expansion. To connect tile
separated parts of the tract with the necessary bridges will cost
one hundred thousand dollars, and even with this done, the use of
the whole tract as a unit will be rendered less convenient by the
presence of the ditch. It is apparent in this situation that the
"value to the owner" of this strip-what he would give for it if
he unexpectedly discovered that his supposed title to it had failedis far greater than its value for sale independently to the ordinary
purchaser of suburban acreage. Market value in that sense would
not justly compensate the owner for the strip taken. In these
situations, while the courts frequently cling to the phraseology of
"market value of the land taken," they use the term with a special meaning. Their aim seems to be to give as compensation for
the strip a fair share of the market value of the entire tract
apportioned according to the strategic importance and fractional
area of the strip. This shades into an allowance of the damage
to the entire tract by the taking; that is, of the difference between
the market value of the whole tract before, and its market value
after the taking.2 7 This last formula seems to be practically universally approved by the courts2 for use in cases where a part is
27
The blending of the formulas, market value of the land taken, proportionate value as part of the entire tract, and loss in value of the entire tract
by the taking is interestingly seen in the following instructions which were
ordered to be given to the jury, in the case cited in the next preceding note:
"You are therefore to consider the fair market value of the tract of 9.3
acres taken in relation to the entire 170 acres of which the said tract was a
part, and as it was before it was known or understood that the channel was
to be constructed over and through this property, taking into consideration
all the purposes for which you may believe from the evidence this 170
acres was adapted. You are further to consider the damage, if any, to the
remaining 160.7 acres, after these 9.3 acres are taken, and prudently used
for the purposes taken, the shape of the pieces left, their condition, connection with and relation to each other, and the added burden, if any, of erecting and thereafter maintaining any bridges or other improvements that you
may find from the evidence will, after and because of the taking be reasonably necessary to afford the defendant such reasonable use and enjoyment
of its property as was had before the taking; and considering these things,
you will award the defendant such a sum as you may believe from the evidence is the fair and reasonable market value of the 9.3 acres taken, and in
addition, such sum as will reasonably compensate defendant for the damage.
if any, done to the 160.7 acres remaining. The entire amount of your finding
should not exceed the difference between the actual fair market value of
the entire tract of 170 acres immediately before it was known or understood
that the channel was to be constructed over and through the land of the
defendant, and the fair market value of what is left immediately after the
taking."
2
8United States v. Grizzard. (1910) 219 U. S. 180, 31 Sup. Ct. 162, 55
L. Ed. 165, 31 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1135 (part of farm permanently flooded.
cutting off rest of farm from access to the highway; owner entitled to
recover not merely the separate value of the flooded land, but the diminution
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taken from a larger tract, best usable or salable as a unit..21 It is a
useful and understandable method of stating to juries or contniissioners what is often a complex and difficult problem of compensation. Of course, none of these formulas can furnish universal
or automatic solutions to the widely varying and infinitely complex questions of apportionment and appraisal raised in these cases
of partial takings. They inescapably require the use of individual
judgment, experience, and discretion in the application of the
formulas to the particular case. Those states which delegate this
function to juries secure tolerable results only by virtue of the
measure of control exerted by trial and appellate courts.
3.

THE VALUATION OF LIMITED INTERESTS

The ownership of land is for ordinary purposes looked upon
as a simple and single property right. For other purposes, howin value of the entire farm) ; McRea v. Marion County, (1931) 222 Ala.
511, 133 So. 278 (land taken for highway) ; Munson v. McDonald, (1931)
113 Conn. 651, 155 Atl. 910; City of Chicago v. Koff, (1930) 341 Il. 520,
529, 173 N. E. 666 (street widening) ; Kosters v. Sioux County, (1923) 195
Iowa 214, 191 N. W. 993 (part of farm taken for highway) ; Prairie Pipe
Line Co. v. Shipp, (1924) 305 Mo. 663, 267 S. W. 647; In re Fourth Avenue.
(1930) 255 N. Y. 25, 173 N. E. 910 (street widening) ; Wadsworth Land
Co. v. Charlotte Electric Co., (1915) 170 N. C. 674, 88 S. E. 439 (railroad
right of way) ; Essex Storage Electric Co. v. Victory Lumber Co., (1919)
93 Vt. 437, 108 Atl. 426 (commissioners may properly arrive at diminution
in value of entire tract, by adding to the value of the land taken the injury
to what remained). Obviously, one circumstance to be considered in determining the diminution in value to the owner, and likewise in market value,
of the entire property is the expenditure necessary to make the remaining
property usable, after the taking. Producers' Wood Preserving Co. v.
Commissioners, (1928) 227 Ky. 159, 12 S. W. (2d) 292; Wood v. Wyoming
County Court, (1925) 100 W. Va. 29, 129 S. E. 747.
2
9Since the standard by which the effect on a large tract is considered
usually yields more generous damages than a formula which confines attention solely to the value of the parcel taken, disputes occur as to when the
other nearby lands of the owner are to be deemed part of the same tract.
Where an owner had three adjoining farms, separately used and improved,
one of which was taken in its entirety, the compensation was confined to the
value of the farm taken. Sharp v. United States, (1903) 191 ,U. S. 341, 24
Sup. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211. But the fact that the owner has platted the
tract into lots and blocks does not prevent the entire tract from being regarded as a unit. Alabama Central R. C. v. Musgrove, (1910) 169 Ala. 424,
53 So. 1009. If used as one body of land, it is immaterial that it is traversed
by roads. St. Louis M. & S. E. R. Co. v. Drummond Co., (1907) 205 Mo.
167, 103 S. W. 977, 120 Am. St. Rep. 724. Or that a mining property is
crossed by a railroad. Missouri, K. & N. W. R. Co. v. Schmuck, (1906)
79 Kan. 545, 100 Pac. 282. A building, constructed and used as a unit, is to
be so considered, in assessing damages for the construction of an elevated
railroad, though the building also has another frontage on another street.
Bischoff v. N. Y. El. R. Co., (1893) 138 N. Y. 257, 33 N. E. 1073. See
Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent Domain, sec. 137.
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ever, it is convenient to think of the various component parts of
this thing we call ownership. When ownership of a piece of land
is complete and unincumbered, it includes a great host of interests
and advantages which the owner may enjoy under the protection
of the courts. It includes the privileges of occupying and using
the land in all conceivable ways which are not hurtful to others,
the right to have other people refrain from trespassing on the land
and from inflicting nuisance upon the occupants, and the power
to sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise transfer various of these interests and advantages. 30 In previous sections we have been discussing compensation for the taking of the owner's land upon the
provisional assumptions that the owner's ownership was as complete as the law recognizes, that is, an unincumbered fee simple in
possession, and that the taking was equally complete, that is, a
vesting in the condemnor of all of the owner's title. As often as
not, however, the entirety of interests and advantages constituting "title" to the land condemned may be parcelled out among
various holders, and likewise the taking may be only of some one
privilege such as a right of way. Naturally, this complicates the
problem of measuring compensation, since a given holder can of
course demand payment only to the extent of his interest, and
then only to the extent to which that interest has been lessened
by the taking.
Usually the statutes provide that all the persons having interests which will be affected by the taking shall be made parties to
the proceeding, and compensation is to be assessed as a whole,
with distribution among the various claimants to be made when
their respective interests have been ascertained. 3 ' However, the
claims of particular claimants of partial interests are frequently
isolated by the fact that other holders of interests have settled with
the condemnor for their claims, and only the particular claimants remain to be litigated with. 32 Furthermore, despite such
statutes it is not always true that the whole is equal to the sum of
its parts. The title to land may be so divided that the buying in
of the outstanding interests so as to acquire a present complete
ownership would be so difficult that the sum of the values of the
3
oSee Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, (1917) 26 Yale L J.
710. 31
See for example, Massachusetts, Gen. L., 1921, ch. 79, sec. 29. See
v. United States, (App. D. C. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 926, 927.
Carlock
t 2
3 As, for example, in Ft. Worth & D. S. P. Ry. Co. v. Judd, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928) 4 S. W. (2d) 1032.
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various interests is worth much less than the complete title would
be. Thus, in a case in which the City of Boston sought to condemn a strip of land for a public street, it appeared that the strip
was already burdened by a private right of way in favor of the
owner of a neighboring wharf to which it furnished access. Tile
fee-owner of the strip and the wharf-owner who held the right
of way sought to have the strip valued as a unit as if unincumbered.
It was agreed that if it were unincumbered the entire estate would
be worth sixty thousand dollars, but as burdened by the easement,
the interests of all claimants would only be damaged to the extent
of five thousand dollars by taking away the right to exclude the
public from what was already an open passageway. It was held
that the City was only bound to pay the lesser sum. 3 This view,
that where strips of land already burdened by easements of way
which make it impracticable to use them for other purposes are
taken for public use so as to impose no further practical disadvantage upon the owner either in respect to the use of the strip
or of his adjoining land, the owner is entitled only to nominal
compensation, finds frequent application.
Interesting analogous
situations are presented in the frequent instances where land, already condemned for railway purposes, is sought to be burdened
by an additional public use, such as the construction of a telegraph
line along the railroad, or the opening of a highway across the
tracks. Whether in such cases the owner of the fee is entitled to
be compensated as for an "additional burden" and, if so, how his
damages are to be measured, are matters upon which the courts
are not in agreement."
33

Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, (1909) 217 U. S.
189, 30 Sup. Ct. 459, 54 L. Ed. 725. In that case, the court said: "It is true
that the mere mode of occupation does not necessarily limit the right of an
owner's recovery. [Citations] But the constitution does not require a disregard of the mode of ownership--of the state of the title. It does not
require a parcel of land to be valued as an unincumbered whole when it is
not held as an unincumbered whole. It merely requires that an owner of
property taken should be paid for what is taken from him. It deals with
persons, not with tracts of land. And the question is what has the owner
lost, not what has the taker gained. We regard it as entirely plain that the
petitioners were not entitled as matter of law to have the damages estimated
as if the land was the sole property of one owner, and therefore are not
entitled
to $60,000 under their agreement."
3
4City of Lewiston v. Brinton, (1925) 41 Idaho 317, 239 Pac. 738; City
of St. Louis v. Clegg, (1921) 289 Mo. 321, 233 S. W. 1, 17 A. L. R. 1242;
Current
& Decennial Digests, Eminent Domain, sec. 149.
35
See notes, relating to the addition of telegraph lines along railroad or
highway, 8 A. L. R. 1293, 19 A. L. R. 383. As to the railroad's compensation, when a street-crossing is made, see comment, see (1925) 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 774.
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A lease-holder or tenant for a term is entitled to compensation to the extent of the net market value of the term; that is, the
value of the occupancy for the rest of the term, over and above
the amount which under the lease must be paid out as rent."' Here
again market value is highly theoretical, being what it would presumably be worth while for a hypothetical purchaser to pay. An
interesting question, related to those discussed in earlier sections
of this article, is presented by the situation where an owner has
leased the land for a fixed term under a lease which binds the
tenant to use the premises only for certain specified purposes.
Land is, as we have seen, usually valued at the amount which
a hypothetical purchaser who intended to devote it to the highest
and most profitable purpose should presumably be willing to pay.
Suppose the most profitable use would be for a store, but the
tenant is restricted to the use of the premises as a residence, may
his lease be valued as if available for store purposes? Seemingly
not,3" and here again the whole estate might be worth more than
the sum of the values of the tenant's and landlord's separate interests. Where the landlord reserves the power to cancel the
lease upon payment of a certain sum to the tenant, that sum is
the outside limit of the value of the term, for presumably the landlord will cancel if the market value of the right of occupancy
for the term comes to exceed this amount.3 s
36

Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, (1924) 199
Ia. 1082, 198 N. WV.486, 34 A. L R. 1517; City of Baltimore v. Gamse &
Bro., (1918) 132 Md. 290, 104 Atl. 429; In re Seventh Avenue, (1921) 196
App. Div. 451, 188 N. Y. S. 197. As to methods of valuing the respective
interests in long-term leases, see Zangerle, Principles of Real Estate Appraising, ch. 15; Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, Real Estate Appraising,
ch. IX. Improvements, including those added by the lessee, are to be considered in valuing the leasehold, only to the extent that they enhance its
value. Carlock v. United States, (App. D.C. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 926; Bales
v. Wichita M. V. R. Co., (1914) 92 Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 1009, L. R. A.
1916C 1090. But if trade-fixtures, installed by the lessee and removable by
him at the end of the lease, are taken, the lessee is entitled to their full
value. City of St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R_ Co., (1916) 266 Mo.
694, 182 S. W. 750, L. R. A. 1916D 713; In re Allen Street & First Avenue,
(1931) 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N. E. 377. See infra, sec. 4, notes 16-18. The
shares of the compensation given to tenant and landlord respectively will be
affected by whether the tenant must continue to pay rent after the taking.
The tenant no longer need pay any rent if the whole premises are taken, but
if only part is taken, the cases are divided, most courts holding that the
tenant must continue to pay the full rent, but a minority holding that the
rent is reduced proportionately. See Corrigan v. Chicago, (1893) 144 Ill.
537, 33 N. E. 746, 21 L. R. A. 212; Decennial & Current Digests, Landlord
& Tenant,
sec. 191; 36 C. J. 319.
37
North Coast R. Co. v. A. A. Kraft Co., (1911) 63 Wash. 250, 115
Pac. 97 (tenant's use of premises restricted to harness and saddlery or similar business).
3
sKafka v. Davidson, (1917) 135 Minn. 389, 160 N. W. 1020 (tenant's
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When we come to assess the value of the interest of the landlord or reversioner at its market-value, we find that it is affected
not merely by the usable qualities of the land, but by the actual
terms of the lease and particularly the amount of the rent.39 If
the rent reserved in the lease is greater, as it often may be, than
the amount for which property could now be rented, the value of
the reversion might conceivably even be greater, if the lease is
for a long term, than the value of the entire fee simple in possession.
If the land is held by a life-tenant, the life-estate and the reversion, under the procedure obtaining under some statutes, may
be valued with the aid of the tables of mortality which show the
life-expectancy of the tenant,4" or under others, the amount of
the compensation for the land as a whole may be placed in the
hands of a trustee to pay the interest to the life-tenant, on whose
41
death the principal goes to the reversioner.
The interests of a lessee or a life-tenant give them the right to
possession. They may easily be thought of as "owners" for the
time being. There are other types of interests whose holders
would hardly be regarded as "owners" of the land, and this has
sometimes been a stumbling-block. A recent New York case
denied compensation to a lessee for the value of an option to
purchase, which had not been exercised when the condemnation
was instituted.42 Such an option, if the price at which it may be
exercised is favorable, may be a highly valuable interest, in the
nature of a "power," and its value is readily measurable, and
should be paid for.43 Even more clearly is the holder of an easelease being terminable by landlord on 60 days notice and payment of $1500,
his damages could not exceed $1500 plus excess of value of occupancy for 60
days 39over rentals payable during that period).
See for example, City of Chicago v. Lord, (1917) 276 Ill. 544, 115
N. E. 8, 11, where the court held that the land might be valued at twenty
times the annual rent under the existing lease, and in referring to evidence
of rentals on nearby property, said: "Such evidence is sometimes valuable,
but the question in this case is not what the property could or might be
rented for, but what it actually was rented for, and the corresponding cash
value40to the owner."
Miller v. City of Asheville, (1893) 112 N. C. 769, 16 S. E. 765; Pittsburgh, Va. & Charleston R. Co. v. Bentley, (1878) 88 Pa. St. 178; See
comment, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 169, which deals also with the valuation of
remote contingent interests, such as executory devises, and possibilities of
reverter.
41See
Turner v. Robbins, (1882) 133 Mass. 207.
42
1n re Water Front, (1927) 246 N. Y. 1, 157 N. E. 913.
43
See comment, (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 100. Compare Hercey v.
Board, (1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 525, 133 Atil. 872 which allows compensation to
a lessee for the value added to the lease by an option to renew.
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ment in the land condemned not an "'owner" in a popular sense,
but his interest is regarded as compensable."
Moreover, under
the better and prevailing view, where restrictions are imposed
upon land to the effect that it shall be used or built upon only in
certain ways, the benefit of such restrictions (now almost universally imposed in the sale of land in subdivisions) is likewise
".property" which is "taken" when part of the land is condemned
for public uses which violate the restrictions.," In the case of
the standardized type of easements, such as an easement of way
across neighboring land for access to the owner's land, or an easement of light, it would seem that the normal standard of lessening
in market value of the benefited land by deprivation of the advantage of the easement would suffice." Equitable restrictions are
sometimes imposed from aesthetic motives, which are important
to the owner but might not affect prospective purchasers. Can
compensation be given on that account? In an interesting recent
Connecticut case, the owner of a spacious country house was protected in the outlook over a neighboring tract by an equitable restriction against buildings thereon which would cut off the owner's
view. The town built a high school on the tract, so as to obstruct the view. The court held 47 that the owner should not be
limited to the sum found to be the amount of the lessening of
-market value, but that while no separate assessment of "individual damages" could be made, the whole award might be made
on the basis of the lessening of the "actual" value to the owner, to
determine which the owner's individual deprivation of enjoyment
of the premises might be considered. Thus again is illustrated
the elasticity of the "value" concept.
44Village of Bradley v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., (1921) 296 Ill. 383, 129
N. E. 744 (privilege of operating railroad in street) ; Decennial & Current
Digests, Eminent Domain, sec. 85.
45Nichols, Eminent Domain, 2d ed., sec. 224, Town of Stamford v.
Vuono, (1928) 108 Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 245; Johnstone v. Detroit, etc., R.
Co., (1928) 245 Mich. 65, 222 N. W. 325; Peters v. Buckner, (1921) 288
Mo. 618, 232 S. W. 1024, 17 A. L. R. 543: Flynn v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
(1916) 218 N. Y. 140, 144, 112 N. E. 913. Contra: Friesen v. City of
Glendale, (1930) 209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 1080. The cases are collected and
discussed in an instructive note by Mr. J. G. Whyte, (1930) 19 Calif. L.
Rev. 58.
46See, for example, Neff v. Penn. R. R. Co., (1902) 202 Pa. St. 371,
51 Atl. 1038 (for deprivation of use of right of way, by removing bridge,
owner allowed to recover diminution in value of farm to which it gave
access).
47Town of Stamford v. Vuono, (1928) 108 Conn. 359, 143 At. 245 (12).
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4.

CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE TAKING: EXPENSE
OF MOVING, INCONVENIENCE, INTERRUPTION OF BUSINESS,

AND Loss OF GOODWILL

Does the fact that the land which is taken for public use is
occupied and used as a business establishment or otherwise, and
that this occupancy will be terminated by the seizure of the preniises, affect in any way the measure of compensation? It is apparent that the disturbance of a business causes loss beyond that
suffered by one from whom improved but vacant land is taken.
Usually, the state constitutions follow the Federal Constitution
which merely provides in general terms for "just compensation"

for "property taken." Most statutes, likewise, go no further than
to provide for the payment of the "value" of the "property,"'" or
in general terms for "compensation. ' 49 Under these general statutes the courts almost universally deny recovery for any loss
other than the value of the land taken." Nevertheless, "value" is
a term of relative flexibility, as has already appeared.
One principal detriment which may be suffered by one whose
business location is taken from him is loss of goodwill; that is,
the value of anticipated future profits based upon past performance. 5' This element of goodwill is constantly considered by
sellers and buyers as one of the items going to make up the selling
price of a business. If the business itself is taken by eminent
domain, and not merely the physical property, the goodwill as an
element of the value of the business must be paid for."
But
where merely the land and buildings are taken, the owner, of
4

SFor example, the New Jersey statute (P. L. 1924 p. 501, amended by
P. L. 1925, p. 233) relating to taking of land for streets provides merely for
"an award for said lands and real estate." See City of Newark v. Cook,
(1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 527, 133 Ati. 875, 879; see also, California Code Civ.
Proc., sec. 1248 (1), construed in City of Oakland v. Pac. Coast Lumber Co.,
(1916)
171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705, 707.
49
For example, Illinois, Rev. Stats., Smith-Hurd, 1931, ch. 47, secs. 8, 9.
50
See cases in notes 52, 57, 59, this section.
5t
An excellent short discussion of the use of the term "goodwill" by
economists and lawyers appears in (1931) 6 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 698. The
author says: "Goodwill originally meant that part of the value of an
established business which was attributable to the continued patronage of
its customers. This meaning has since been extended. Economists continue
to adhere essentially to the original concept of goodwill as a relation between
the business and the market. But while they still consider the goodwill of
the consumer as by far the most important type they recognize also the
existence of goodwill in the labor market, the credit market and elsewhere."
Definitions of the term are quoted in (1927) 65 -U. of Pa. L. Rev. 783.
5-See Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., (1917) 246 U. S. 178, 38
Sup. Ct. 278, 62 L. Ed. 649.
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course, can re-establish and continue his business in a new location. He loses goodwill only to the extent that his patronage can-

not be transferred to a new location. In the case of retail
stores and other businesses, where customers are dealt with
directly, goodwill is to a substantial degree attached to the old
place. In other businesses, the specific location is of much
less importance. The courts, however, have treated all businesses alike in this respect, and have consistently held, in this
country, that under the general constitutional and statutory
provisions no compensation will be made for the loss of
goodwill. 53 A doubt that goodwill is "property" could hardly
have been a controlling reason for their conclusions, since "property" has many meanings which include, beside the meaning of
interests in tangible things, the meaning of pecuniary interests
generally. For other purposes goodwill is readily recognized as
"property" by the courts.5 4 The English and Canadian courts,
moreover, have no difficulty in finding that goodwill is property
which is "taken" and is to be paid for when a business location is
appropriated. 5 The real reason, probably, which has brought
the courts to the unusual position of denying payment for this
undoubted business loss is an administrative one. It is "speculative," 6 they say, or in other words it is difficult to value, since the
53

Mitchell v. United States (1925) 267 U. S. 341, 45 Sup. Ct. 293, 69 L
Ed. 644; Oakland v. Pac. Coast Lumber Co., (1915) 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac.
705; Bales v. Wichita Midland V. R. Co., (1914) 92 Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 1009,
L. R. A. 1916C 1090 (claim by lessee for item of deprivation of value of
established business. denibd) ; Morrison v. Cottonwood Development Co.,
(1928) 38 Wyo. 190, 266 Pac. 117 (15) (evidence of damage to ranching
business, held properly excluded; statute construed as allowing recovery for
damage to business, to tenants only and not to owners). A leading recent
case is Banner Milling Co. v. State (1925) 240 N. Y. 533, 148 N. E. 668.
Numerous decisions to like effect are collected in the note to this case, 41
A. L. R. 1026, and in comments on this and other cases in the law reviews:
(1927) 75,U. of Pa. L. Rev. 783; (1930) 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 112: (1926)
39 Harv. L. Rev. 654; (1926) 11 Corn. L. Q. 215. The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitutiton forbidding deprivation of property without
due process of law does not require compensation to be made for injury to
business, nor does it forbid such compensation. Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, (1923) 262 U. S. 668, 43 Sup. Ct. 684, 67 L. Ed. 1167.
54Goodwill is recognized as a partnership asset in Slater v. Slater,
(1903) 175 N. Y. 143, 67 N. E. 224. It may be sold, or passed by will.
Howard v. Taylor, (1889) 90 Ala. 241, 8 So. 36.
55
Senior v. Metropolitan R. Co., (1863) 2 Hurlst. & C. 258, 2 New Rep.
334, 32 L. J. Ex. 225, 8 L. T. 544, 11 W. R. 836; Re McCauley, (1889) 18
Ont. Rep. 416.
56
Banner Milling Co. v. State, (1925) 240 N. Y. 533, 148 N. E. 668.
Compare the language of Holmes, C. J. in Sawyer v. Commonwealth, (1902)
182 Mass. 245, 247, 65 N. E. 52: "No doubt a business may be property in a
broad sense of the word, and property of great value. It may be assumed
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economists and accountants themselves have worked out no accepted formulas which can be followed,"7 and the allowance of this
item therefore might open a door to unjust and exaggerated
awards.
As the commercial world moves toward a standardized practice in computing the value of goodwill, and as the jury in eminent
domain proceedings gives place more and more to expert commissioners of appraisal, we may expect a growing tendency of legislatures and courts to give compensation for injury to the goodwill
of a business by a forced change of location.
Much less "speculative" is the direct loss of business which
may be imposed by the cessation of operations for the period necessary for moving to a new location. But even this loss, unless
expressly made compensable by the statute, is usually cast utpon
the owner by the courts."8 Another serious element of loss, about
which no tinge of uncertainty or difficulty of ascertainment exists,59 is the actual expense necessitated by moving the stock and
movable equipment of the business to a new location. Even here
the courts, where the statutory provision for "just compensation"
is general, and does not specifically authorize compensation for
this, adhere to their holding that only the "value" of the land taken
may be given and that the general expense of moving may not be
awarded as an independent item of compensation.
One court
for the purposes of this case that there might be such a taking of it as required compensation. But a business is less tangible in nature and more
uncertain in its vicissitudes than the rights which the constitution undertakes
absolutely to protect."
5'See
(1931) 6 Encyc. Soc. Sciences 698. supra n. 51.
5
sCity of St. Louis v. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co., (1916) 266 Mo. 701,
182 S.W. 750, L. R. A. 1916D 713, Ann. Cas. 1918B 881 (claim by lessee,
denied) ; State Airport Commission v. May, (1930) 51 R. I. 110, 152 Atl.
225 (claim by owner of land taken for airport for injury to poultry business,
denied. "In the instant case the business conducted on the land in question
was not taken, and it may be moved to and conducted at another location.
Compensation for the property actually taken for public uses is provided for,
and any incidental loss or inconvenience to the business must be borne by
the owner in the interest of the general public.")
59 The suggestion is made in the first case cited in the next preceding
note that there is uncertainty in that different owners would move different
distances. This seems hypercritical. The actual cost of any move within a
reasonable ambit is a criterion which offers little difficulty on the score of
certainty.
60
City of Newark v. Cook, (1926) 99 N. J. Eq. 527, 133 Atd. 875, 879
and cases in the three succeeding notes. Contra: Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co. v. Hock, (1886) 118 Il1. 587, 9 N. E. 205. Compare Wood v. Wyoming
County Court, (1925) 100 W. Va. 29, 129 S.E. 747, and comment in (1926)
26 Col. L. Rev. 625 (allowance of compensation for expense putting remaining land in usable shape).
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suggests that, since in case of a private sale the seller moves at
his own expense, the same result should follow in case of forced
sale in condemnation. 6 Accordingly, compensation was denied
for the cost of removing a large quantity of hay from a ranch
which was taken as a reservoir site 2 and for the removal of a
stock of goods from a warehouse.6"
Somewhat different considerations apply to fixtures and improvements, as distinguished from the occupant's movable property. If these built-in improvements are taken, as part of the
land, they must of course be paid for."4 The owner of the land
is entitled to the amount to which they enhance its value, 5 unless
the premises are occupied by a tenant, in which event the latter
shares in the compensation for the fixtures so far as they increase the value of the tenancy,66 if the tenant has installed the
fixtures and has the power of removal.6
Frequently, however,
the appropriator is empowered by statute to exclude the fixtures
and improvements from the property taken,", or this exclusion is
agreed upon by the parties. In such event, while the decisions are
not harmonious, it would seem that compensation for the cost of
removal to a new site, within a reasonable distance, might be
worked out in favor of the owner of the land"' by use of the doc61

In re Widening Third Street in St. Paul, (1929) 176 Minn. 389, 223

N. W.
62 458.

Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Warm Springs Irr. Dist., (C.C.A. 9th Cir.
1921) 270 Fed. 555 (6). See also In re Post Office Site, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir.
1914)63 210 Fed. 832 (3).
Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1922) 284 Fed.
849. 6
4See note 36 supra. For examples of statutes construed to require the
condemning authority to take fixtures as part of the land, see In re Allen
Street and First Avenue, (1931) 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N. E. 377 (tenant's
fixtures) ; City of Goldsboro v. Holmes, (1920) 180 N. C. 99, 104 S. E. 140
(house
on premises).
65
See supra, n. 1.

66
67See

supra, part 3, n. 36.
Matter of New York, (1905) 101 App. Div. 527, 92 N. Y. S. 8, affirmed 182 N. Y. 281, 74 N. E. 840. Compare Pause v. Atlanta, (1890) 98
Ga. 92,
26 S. E. 489, 58 Am. St. Rep. 290.
68
For example, Mfassachusetts, Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 79, Massachusetts,
Pub.69Stats. 1882, ch. 49, sec. 9.
Hire v. Knisely, (1892) 130 Ind. 295, 29 N. E. 1132 (cost of moving
fence) ; Benton v. Town of Brookline, (1890) 15i Mass. 250, 23 N. F 846
(considered in determining credit for value of building not taken) ; City of
St Louis v. Brown, (1900) 155 Mo. 545, 56 S. W. 298 (5); Oil Field &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Treese Cotton Oil Co., (1920) 78 Okla. 25, 187 Pac. -201;
Ft Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Judd, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 4 S. W. (2d)
1032 (21) (cost of removal is independent item of damages). Contra:
Sherwood v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., (1874) 21 Mfinn. 122; Grugan v. Philadelphia, (1893) 158 Pa. St. 337, 27 Atl. 1000. The cases are collected in
Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent Domain, sec. 95, and 20 C. J. 803.
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trine that where only part of the land is taken, the measure of
compensation is the difference between the value of the entire
property before the taking and the value after the condemnation
of the part not taken.
Under this theory, the owner would recover the value of the land and improvements, less the value of the
improvements required to be removed. Of course, this deduction
would be diminished by the fact that the value of the improvements would be no greater than what they were worth after subtracting the cost of making them usable by moving them to a new
location.
This theory has been used to justify a similar allowance for
expense of moving fixtures in favor of a tenant, who is permitted by the condemnor to retain the improvements he has installed. 7 1 The appropriateness of the theory as a basis for allowing to the tenant, even indirectly, the full present cost of moving
fixtures seems dubious. The value of the entire interest that the
tenant had before the taking consisted of (a) the value of the
right of occupancy for the term, and (b) the present value of the
power of removing the fixtures in future and using them at tile
end of the term. It is apparent that the value of item (b) is directly lessened by the prospective cost of removal. But from the
aggregate of (a) and (b) we must deduct (c) the value of the
property not taken; that is, the value of the fixtures now preimaturely detached. Item (c) again is concededly depreciated by the
present cost of removal, but since (b) is depreciated by the prospective cost of removal, the award of (a) plus (b) minus (c)
seems to result in canceling out the claim for cost of removal, except to the extent of the value of the privilege of postponing the
cxpenditure until the end of the term. Since the tenant would
ultimately have been faced with paying the cost of removing fixtures, in the absence of condemnation, it is difficult to see why the
condemnor should have to pay the whole cost, simply because it is
72
prematurely imposed on the tenant.
An examination of the cases dealing with the liability of the
condenmnor for the incidental. but often serious, losses imposed
7

"See part 2, supra.
7"St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., (1916)

266 Mo. 694, 182

S. W. 750, L. R. A. 1916D 713. Ann. Cas. 1918B 881 : Des ,Moines Wet Wash
Laundry Co. v. City of Des Moines, (1924)

34 A.2 L. R. 1517 with note on this point.

197 Iowa 1082, 198 N. W. 486,

Compensation to a tenant for cost of removing fixtures was denied on
this ground in Baltimore v. Gamse, (1918) 132 Md. 290, 104 Atl. 429.
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upon the occupant of premises by his being forced to move out
discloses an interesting progression in judicial thought toward
expanding the concept of "market value" so as to embrace these
losses.7 3 It is true that the occupancy of business premises does
in some respects unquestionably enhance the market value of the
land. A piece of property which has a record of continuous successful occupancy is more highly regarded by a prospective purchaser than a similar building which has a record of vacancies.74
Likewise, the mere operation of a manufacturing plant as a "going concern" adds to the value of the plant, above the value of its
constituent parts, by reason of their being combined into an effi.cient, functioning unit.-, These matters do influence market value.
But courts have frequently said that loss of goodwill, loss of
business and inconvenience from interruption, and cost of removal also influence market value. Market value being either the
actual current price for like property, or the hypothetical price at
which a willing seller and a willing buyer would meet each other's
demands, can we say that market value would be affected by these
costs, so that a jury should be instructed to consider them in estimating such value? It is suggested"0 that a seller would be unwilling to sell except at a price which would cover, not merely
the amount at which he valued the land and buildings, but the incidental losses of business and the expense and inconvenience
which would result from breaking up his establishment. It is
submitted, however, that this does not stand the test of sound
economic theory. Regardless of the desires of the seller, the purchaser will seek in the market the property which meets his needs
at the lowest price. In most instances, buildings temporarily vacant, or occupied by tenants who are intending to vacate, which
are suitable to the purchaser's requirements will be offered him.
These other sellers will have no motive to demand a price which
will cover the losses incidental to removal, for the sale by them
would have no such effect. They can afford to offer their prop73
It is possible that the desire of legislatures and courts in an earlier
day to encourage the building of highways and railroads so as to hasten the
development of the country may have had its influence in molding the severely restrictive rules as to compensation for incidental damage. Such damage
is likely to be less important also in pioneer rural conditions than in presentday 74
urban surroundings.
Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids, (1907) 134 Iow%-a 563, 111 N. WV.1027

(1).

75
Banner Milling Co. v. State, (1925) 240 N. Y. 533, 148 N. E. 668, 41
A. L. R. 1019, 1025.
,"See note, 51 L. R. A. 320 at pages 330, 333.
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erty at a price which includes no such items, and presumably they
will do so. Presumably, therefore, the purchaser will offer our
seller, who is facing removal-expense, no more than such purchaser would pay for other equally desirable property. Consequently, it seems that except in the unusual instance of property
which would be in demand from purchasers who could not, because of an absence of available vacant property, supply their
needs except by buying land occupied by going business establishments the incidental losses mentioned cannot properly be
awarded, or even considered, as an element of market value. Unless the language of the statute limits the compensation to market
value, however, it seems open to the courts to summon into use
the doctrine that when market value is inadequate to afford fair
reimbursement to the owner, the damages may be measured by
the value of the property, not on the market but to the owner
himself.7 7 An ascertainment of "value to the owner" might well
take account of the losses that the occupant will sustain if he is
forced to part with his business location. Whether this expanded
use of the "value" idea should be adopted is a question of policy.
Under some statutes these losses are expressly made compensable.
More often this is not the case, and only general words such as
"value," "compensation" or "damage" are employed. Most courts
have concluded that the legislature "by not specifying these losses
as compensable has intended to impose them upon the individual
land-owners rather than upon the public enterprise for the furtherance of which the land is taken. Strong reasons of policy and
fairness support the view that recompense for these losses should
be specifically authorized by the legislature, or should be sanctioned by the courts where the way is open, by the use of the concept, not of "market value," but of "value to the owner."
5. COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE NOT RESULTING FROM THE
ING ALONE: INJURY TO REMAINING LAND FROT

rAK-

THE USE OF THE

LAND TAKEN, OR THE CONSTRUCTION OR OPERATION TIIEEON.

In the preceding sections we have directed our attention chiefly
to the loss which the owner of property suffers in direct consequence of the taking of his land, which chiefly consists of the
value of the land taken, or, where part only is taken, of the lessening in value of the whole tract merely because this particular
part was severed from it.
-See part 2, supra.
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It is obvious, however, that the remaining land may be lessened in value, not only to the extent that its area and useability
have been diminished by the fact that a strip or comer has been
cut off, but its value may likewise be conspicuously depreciated by
the new public or semi-public works or enterprise for which the
land taken is to be used. Under many types of condemnation
statutes as judicially construed, where land is to be taken, the
landowner is entitled to compensation for this depreciation in
value of his remaining land due to the prospective construction or
operation of the condemnor's enterprise.7 s This is commonly
true of statutes authorizing the appropriation of land for railroad rights-of-way, for electric power transmission lines, for
streets and highways, and for power dams and drainage-ditches.
Certain limitations, however, upon the compensation for depreciation in value due to prospective construction or operation seem
to be rather generally recognized. Thus, while all of the probable
injury that will flow from the public improvement is to be considered by the tribunal, as it would be considered by a prospective purchaser, speculative and unlikely possibilities of harm are
to be excluded, as well as the possibility of unlawful or negligent construction or operation of the enterprise." For example,
ordinary danger of fires on surrounding lands unavoidably caused
by operation of a railroad may be considered in condemnation of
land for a railway,80 and so also the effect on the value of the
land retained of the prospect of nearby smoke, noise, cinders, and
vibration from the trains."' Numerous recent decisions relate to
the condemnation of rights-of-way for electric power transmission lines, and it has been necessary here to curb over-imaginative
speculations as to possible dangers. It has been held in certain of
these cases that evidence of the necessity of the entry of the
power company's employees upon the land to patrol and repair
the line and the probable consequent disturbance of cattle, as
78Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., (1914) 191 Ala. 58, 64, 67
So. 833, Ann. Cas. 1917C 878 (electric power transmission line) ; Cleveland,
etc., R. Co. v. Hadley, (1913) 179 Ind. 429, 441, 101 N. E. 473, 477, 45 L.
R. A. (N.S.) 796; Lewisburg & N. R. Co. v. Hinds, (1915) 134 Tenn. 293,
183 S. W. 985, L. R. A. 1916E 420, and other cases, cited Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent Domain, secs. 94-113, 20 C. J. 763, n. 55; see also,
note (1927) 2 Wash. L. Rev. 192, 195.
79See cases in succeeding notes, to this section.
S0Texas Midland R. C. v. Burt, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 243 S. W. 669;
Idaho & W. R. Co. v. Coey, (1913) 73 Wash. 291, 131 Pac. 810; also Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent Domain, sec. 111.
SlArizona Hercules Copper Co. v. Protestant Episcopal Church (1920)
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bearing upon the market value of grazing land through which the
line ran,8 2 is competent, as is also proof of the probable inconvenience to and obstruction of farming operations by such a powerline,8 3 but that danger that such employees would bring in cattlediseases or would leave gates and fences down was too remote,8
as was also the possibility that fires8" might be produced by a
break in the line, or through added danger from lightning, or the
tear in the minds of prospective purchasers of injury to persons
or property from the breakage or falling of the lines."'
Depreciation in value because of apprehension of improper
construction 87 of the improvement or its negligent or wrongful
operation88 is excluded.

The appropriation which is to be sanc-

tioned will not authorize such wrongful acts, and if they do later
occur, damages for actual harm inflicted may then be recovered,
as in case of any other tort. Another important restriction upon
recovery for depreciation in value due to the proximity of the
improvement is that the landowner must bear without compensation such depreciation as comes from the prospect of inconvenience and damage common to the whole neighborhood. It is
only special injury suffered by the land because of its immediate
proximity that is compensable, ordinarily."9 This reluctance to
21 Ariz. 470, 190 Pac. 85; Lewisburg & N. R. Co. v. Hinds, (1915) 134
Tenn.82 293, 183 S. W. 985, 993, L. R. A. 1916E 420, and note, p. 445.
Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed, (Mo. App. 1930) 32 S. W.
(2d) 783.
83Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Barnett, (1930) 338 1I. 499, 170 N. E.
717. 4
" Missouri Power & Light Co. v. Creed, (,MIo. App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d)
783. 5
8 Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Cooper, (1926) 322 I1. 11, 152 N. E.
491; 86Decheck v. Duquesne Light Co., (1931) 305 Pa. St. 452, 157 Atl. 685.
Yaget v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., (1930) 131 Kan. 267, 291 Pac.
768. Other remote apprehensions, not to be considered, are fear of trespasses by employees of the power company, and fear of difficulties in
securing settlement of claims against it. See Illinois Power & Light Corp.
342, 153 N. E. 577 with note, "Elements &
v. Peterson, (1926) 322 Ill.
Measure of -Compensation for Power Lines or other wire lines over private 87property," 49 A. L. R. 697, 701.
Richardson v. City of Centerville, (1908) 137 Ia. 253, 114 N. W. 1071
(construction of sewer), and cases collected in Current & Decennial
Digests,
Eminent Domain, sec. 92.
s8 CIeveland, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, (1912) 177 Ind. 524, 97 N. E. 164.
171 (operation of railroad) and see cases in note 80 supra. Compare
O'Neill v. S. P., etc., R. Co., (1911) 38 ,Utah 475, 114 Pac. 127.
SIn re Hull, (1925) 163 Minn. 439, 204 N. W. 534, 205 N. W. 613.
49 A. L. R. 320 (one whose lands did not abut on street closed cannot
recover compensation for the closing) ; Lowell v. Buffalo County, (1930)
119 Neb. 776, 230 N. W. 842 (vacation of highway, farm-owner, left with
no through outlet, held to suffer special injury) ; Lewisburg & N. R. Co. v.
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open the door to claims which would be common to everyone in
the community and the consistent tendency to center upon redress
only for those who have suffered real and substantial loss by
reason of the public improvement are manifested also in the
occasional holdings to the effect that prospective harm from construction or operation of the improvement on lands other than
those taken from the claimant is not compensable.9 0
The courts manifest a rather surprising tendency in these
cases to shield the condemnor from liability for damage to the
market value of the remaining land of the owner, so far as such
depreciation is claimed to come from the unsightliness of the
structure or improvement. 1 This probably proceeds from a distrust of the fact-finders' ability to evaluate the injury satisfactorily.
Not infrequently, the public enterprise to be established may
be one which in its use and operation will come directly in competition with a business of the landowner, and damages are
claimed for the lessening of business from such competition. Unless the claimant is by virtue of a lawful franchise entitled to enjoy
a monopoly, of course this claim cannot be allowed. A recent example is a case in Georgia where the state condemned part of the
land belonging to the operator of a ferry for use in building the
approaches for a new bridge. A claim for loss of profits in the
operation of the ferry from the erection of the bridge was dis2
allowed.

9

Hinds, (1915) 134 Tenn. 293, 183 S. NV. 985, L. R. A. 1916E 420 (owner
of land part of which is taken for railroad may recover for impairment of
market value of remainder due to operation of trains, though other nearby
landowners, none of whose land is taken, cannot.)
Cases are collected
in Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent Domain, sec. 91.
9
°Campbell v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 368, 45 Sup. Ct. 115,
69 L. Ed. 328, comment, (1925) 9 ,MINxsoTA LAw REVIEw 385, (damages
to plaintiff's lands from proposed use for industrial purposes of lands
taken from others not compensable): Lewisburg & N. R. Co. v. Dudley,
(1930) 161 Tenn. 546, 30 S. W. (2d) 278 (prospective injury front noise.
etc. from operation of trains limited to operation of trains over the land
taken, and noise while trains approaching over other lands excluded:
rather
a fine distinction).
91
See, for example, Illinois Power & Light Co. v. Peterson, (1926)
322 Ill. 342, 348, 153 N. E. 577, 49 A. L. R. 697 (compensation denied for
unsightliness of power-line on land taken). Compare St. Louis S. XV. R.
Co. v. Heilbron, (1908) 52 Tex. Civ. App. 575, 113 S. \V. 610, 979
(damages for unsightliness of railway cut, not on land taken from plaintiff,
denied).
92
State Highway Board v. Willcox. (1929) 168 Ga. 883. 149 S. E.
182, comment, (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAW RFViFW 296. See also Musceda
Bridge Co. v. Grant County, (1929) 200 Wis. 185. 227 N. XV. 863, (where

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

Let us suppose that lands have been taken in condemnation
and in such proceedings damages were allowed or allowable for
depreciation in value of the other land of the owner due to prospective construction or operation of the enterprise. Then, of
course, if due to such construction or operation in a non-negligent way the actual expected harm ensues, no damages for such
harm may later be recovered. The statute or condemnation decree
has conferred upon the condemnor, at a price, the lawful privilege
of thus constructing or operating the enterprise, and such conduct, though it inflicts harm upon the plaintiff, is not an actionable wrong.
Quite frequently it happens, however, that the
improvement was erected and set in operation without any formal
condemnation proceedings, or such proceedings purported to cover
only the "taking" of land directly appropriated, and not the prospective damages incidental to construction and operation. 4 In
such cases, if the construction or operation of the improvement
does later in fact, whether properly or negligently conducted,
cause special injury to a nearby landowner, such owner may recover for such damage in an independent action at law.1
Such
land taken from owner of toll-bridge for approach to new public free
bridge no compensation should be made for loss of traffic over the
toll-bridge).
93I. & G. N. R. Co. v. Pape, (1884) 62 Tex. 313, 315 (Construction
of railroad. "The appraisement embraces all past, present, and future
damages which the improvement may thereafter reasonably produce ...
Any damage not resulting from negligent or unskillful construction is presumed to be included in the assessment"); Roman Catholic Church v.
Penn. R. Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1913) 207 Fed. 897, L. R. A. 1915E 623
(damage from smoke and cinders in non-negligent operation of railroad).
See 9451 C. J. 1119, 1137.
As in Moses v. Town of Morgantown, (1928) 195 N. C. 92, 141 S. 7.
484, where action was brought for damage due to pollution of water caused
by the operation of a power dam, and it was allowed on the ground that
in the condemnation proceedings this item of damage was expressly excluded by stipulation.
9
5Southern R. Co. v. Perfection Laundry Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1930)
38 F. (2d) 74 (change in grade of street) ; Illinois Power & Light Co.
v. Talbott, (1926) 321 Ill. 538, 152 N. E. 486 (10) (Power transmission
line. "The Constitution, in prohibiting the taking or damaging of private
property for public use without just compensation, recognizes the right
of the owner of property damaged by a public work to recover the amount
of such damages. This right may be asserted by the owner as a plaintiff
in action at law where none of his property is actually taken, or as a defendant to an eminent domain proceeding for the condemnation of property actually taken."); McGowan v. Town of Milford, (1926) 104 Conn.
452, 133 Atl. 571 (where town changed grade of street without institution
of proceedings for that purpose, life-tenant of abutting lot allowed to recover diminution in value of her interest). See cases collected, 20 C. J.
1162, n. 22. There are limitations, such as that against suing the state or
other authority acting in a governmental capacity without its consent.
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claims, in respect to the measure of damages, are closely analogous
to ordinary actions for trespass or nuisance brought against ordinary defendants not vested with the power of eminent domain.
One marked difference appears, however, in the greater willingness of most courts in the class of cases now under consideration
to allow the plaintiff to recover, and to limit him to, the depreciation in the value of his land due to the injury " upon the assumption that it will continue permanently, rather than to allow successive actions for the continuing disturbance or inconvenience in the
use of his land.
6.

BENEFITS ACCRUING TO THE LANDOWNER FROM THE
IMPROVEMENT

Since the object of "just compensation" is to prevent injustice
to individual landowners whose land is taken for public enterprises,
the aim of such compensation is to leave the landowner after his
land is .taken, and the improvement completed, as well-off as he
was before the taking. Fairness does not require that he be placed
in any better position, financially, than he was before, except to
the extent of being allowed to share with the rest of the community
the general enhancement of prosperity and values which may come
from these improvements. It is, accordingly, the usual practice
except when forbidden by special constitutional or statutory inhibitions, 97 in arriving at the amount of compensation or damages,
See, for example, the discussion in Pauchogue Land Corp. v. Long Island
State Park Commission, (1926) 243 N. Y. 15, 152 N. E. 451.
96City of Amarillo v. Ware, (Tex. Comm. App. 1931) 40 S. \V. (2d)

57 (storm-sewer overflowing plaintiff's land: depreciation in value of land.
allowed); Humphreys County v. Washington County, (1922) 128 Miss.
132, 90 So. 710 (damage from laying out public road) ; Gram Construction
Co. -v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., (1917) 36 N. D. 164, 161
N. W. 732 (laying of railway spur track in street); Dietzel v. City of
New York, (1916) 218 N. Y. 270, 112 N. E. 720 (where, pending action
for trespass by constructing sewer on plaintiff's land, condemnation proceedings are brought, permanent damages are recoverable in the action)
Gohman v. City of St. Bernard, (1924) 111 Oh. St. 726, 146 N. E. 291,
41 A. L. R. 1057 (establishment of street grade at unreasonable level):
Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Co., (1916) 255 Pa. St. 196. 99
Atl. 798 (stream diverted from plaintiff's farm, depreciation in value of
farm by the diversion) ; Nelson County v. Loving, (1919) 126 Va. 283, 101
S. E. 406 (damage to farm-land from grading of road). By the Mill Act
in Massachusetts, the plaintiff whose land is flooded, may elect to sue either
in successive actions for damage as it accrues, or for permanent depreciation in value. Ollila v. Huikari, (1921) 237 Mass. 54, 129 N. E. 395. The
cases are collected in Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent Domain, sec.
303. 9 7
See notes 114 and 116, infra, this section.
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to deduct from the award to the owner whether for the taking of
part of his land, or for the construction or operation of the improvement, the value to him of the benefits and advantages which
as owner of the remainder of the tract he will derive from the
improvementY
As a result, the landowner may in jurisdictions
adopting the rule just stated find part of his land taken for a
road or other public improvement, but may be awarded less than
the value of the land taken, or no compensation at all may be
awarded him, where it is found that his remaining land is benefited by the improvement. But as we saw that the injury to the remaining property to be compensable must be injury to the owner
in his capacity as owner of this land, and not in his capacity
merely as a member of the community, so here we find the same
limitation upon benefits. To be deductible the benefit or advantage must be one which the public improvement brings to the
owner of the remaining land because he is such landowner, and
one which the rest of the community as a whole does not share.,"
This conclusion is based on the view that it is inequitable to charge
the landowner whose land is taken or damaged for a benefit which
the rest of the community likewise secures but does not pay for. °00
This distinction between general and individual benefits is of
course a difference in degree and is not always easy to draw. 'hu
981Bauman v. Ross, (1896) 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270
(street) ; Rudder v. Limestone County, (1929) 220 Ala. 485, 125 So. 670,
68 A. L. R. 776 (highway), with note on the constitutionality of statutes
providing for deduction of benefits; Cate v. Crawford County, (1928) 176
Ark. 873, 4 S. W. (2d) 516 (highway) ; Wilcox v. Meriden, (1889) 57
Conn. 120, 17 Atl. 366 (street) ; Newburyport Inst. for Savings v. Brookline, (1915) 220 Mass. 300, 107 N. E. 939 (taking of private passage-way
for public use) ; McKeen v. City of Minneapolis, (1927) 170 Minn. 124.
212 N. W. 202 (street-widening, no damages where benefits offset loss):
Mississippi County v. Byrd, (1928) 319 Mo. 697. 4 S. W. (2d) 810 (roadwidening) ; State v. Hudson County, (1892) 55 N. J. L. 88, 25 Atl. 322,
17 L. R. A. 785 (road-opening) ; Stamey v. Burnsville, (1925) 189 N. C.
39, 126 S. E. 103 (side-walk); Hall v. Delaware R. Co., (1918) 262 l'a.
St. 292, 105 Ati. 98 (railway); 20 C. J. 813, n. 58; note 9 L. R. A. (N.S.)
781, 794; L. R. A. 1918A 884. Cases on deduction for benefits, are collected in Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent Domain, sees. 144-146, 204,
222 (6). In contrast with the holdings noted above are the decisions referred to in a later note (n. 121) which permit benefits to be offset only
against the damages to land not taken.
99 Hickman v. Kansas City, (1894) 120 Mo. 110, 25 S. W. 225. 23
L. R. A. 658 (applies to cases of damaging as well as cases of taking),
and numerous cases collected in Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent
Domain, sec. 146.
100Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. McAllister, (1901) 68 Ark. 600, 604,
60 S. V. 953; Petition of Reeder, (1924) 110 Or. 484, 222 Pac. 724; State
v. Brubeck, (Ind. 1930) 170 N. E. 81.
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where land is taken for laying out, or widening, streets or high.ways, or is injured by a change of grade, the furnishing of additional physical facilities for the occupants of the remaining land,
such as better means of access, or an improved roadway, is a direct
and special benefit which should be offset against the loss or injury, but the general rise in property values in the neighborhood,
shared by this tract, because of improvement worked in the community's transportation situation, is not to be considered.' 0 1 Evidence of a rise in value of the tract remaining has been excluded
on this ground, 102 but the holding seems questionable. The evidence should come in, but the jury should be instructed to determine how far the rise is due to general, and how far to special
benefits.
In railway condemnations, the better access of the remaining
tract to market by reason of the increase of transportation facilities is held to be general in some of the cases and special in others.
If a siding or a loading track is to be made directly available to
the land, this seems a special benefit. 0 3 Where a right to run a
telephone line along a public highway which crossed the owner's
farm was condemned, the accessibility of the line to the landowner
was held to be merely a general public benefit, 04 though here
again the conclusion seems open to question. A similar question
arises as to electric power transmission lines. If connections from
the line may be made for the taking of electricity for use on the
farm over which the line runs, this, it would seem, would be a
special benefit. 10 5
0
'Glendenning
l
v. Stahley, (1910) 173 Ind. 674, 91 N. E. 234; Trosper
v. Saline County, (1882) 27 Kan. 391; Allen v. Charlestown, (1872) 109
Mass. 247. See note, measure of damages where property is taken to

widen sti-eet, 64 A. L. R. 1513, 1533; 20 C. J. 824, n. Similarly, where the

owner's land was boggy and was drained by the construction through it

of a state highway, this was a special benefit. State v. Malone, (Mo.
App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 84. In Newberry v. Hamblen County. (1928)
157 Tenn. 491, 9 S. XV. (2d) 700 the court said: "Increased accessibility to
the owner's property, greater convenience in approach with vehicles, the advantage generally of a front on a more desirable roadway, better drainage,
and a more attractive outlook, are improvements tending to enhance the

value for use and sale of farm and suburban lands immediately abutting

on an improved highway, and constitute special benefits for which allow-

ance 2may be made."
°-State v. Brubeck, (Ind. 1930) 170 N. E. 81 (5).
10 3The decisions are collected and discussed in M,[antorville Railway
& Transfer Co. v. Slingerland, (1907) 101 Minn. 488, 112 N. W. 1033.
11 L.0 4R. A. (N.S.) 277.
1 Riddle v. Lodi Telephone Co., (1921)

175 Wis. 360, 185 N. WV.182,

19 A.05L. R. 380.
But see Kentucky Hydro-Electric Co. v. Reister, (1926) 216 Ky.
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In order that a benefit should be "special" it is not essential
that it be enjoyed solely by the particular landowner. Frequently
other landowners in the vicinity reap like benefits, but this is
immaterial if the benefit is one peculiar to owners bordering on the
improvement and not shared by the whole neighborhood."
Despite this genuine though elusive distinction between betiefits to the individual landowners as such and benefits to the general community, and the feeling of legislatures and courts that if
the rest of the public are to secure free an "unearned increment"
from the improvement, so also should the landowner whose property is taken or directly damaged, a landowner who is actually as
well-off financially after his land has been taken or injured by the
improvement can hardly have any very serious ground of complaint, even though the benefit which made him whole was shared
generally. Consequently, we find that in a few states the money
appropriated for state highways has been made to go as far as
possible by permitting, the state to offset against the landowner's
claim for compensation, not only special, but general benefits as
well.'/°
We have already seen that compensation for injury to remaining land can only be claimed in respect to land which is part of
the tract from which the land is taken, and of course the same is
true as to benefits.' 0 8 Benefits to other disconnected tracts belonging to the landowner cannot be deducted. 0 " Likewise, the
303, 287 S. W. 357 (5). See also Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime
Co., (1914) 191 Ala. 58, 67 So. 833, Ann. Cas. 1917C 878, and other
cases 0cited in note, 49 A. L. R. 697, 703.
' OUnited States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., (1926) 269 U. S.
411, 416, 46 Sup. Ct. 144, 70 L. Ed. 339 (benefit to owner of part of riverbank from improvement of channel, may be "special" though similar benefits accrue to other riparian owners) ; State v. Young, (1929) 324 Mo. 277.
23 S. W. (2d) 130 (8) (hard surface road through farm; error to charge
that only those benefits "peculiar to the tract itself" may be deducted):
Faulkner v. City of Nashville, (1926) 154 Tenn. 145, 285 S. W. 39 (increased accessibility of lots along widened street) ; Town of Galax v.
Waugh, (1925). 143 Va. 213, 129 S. E. 504 (change of grade of street
affecting several property-owners along street, is "special"). The opinion
in Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Vance, (1907) 225 II1. 270. 80 N. E. 134 which
seems to sanction the deduction of "general" benefits in a railway condemnation, probably was intended to go no further than the foregoing
case. 0 7
1 Wade v. State Highway Commission, (1924) 188 N. C. 210, 124
S. E. 193; Nowaczyk v. Marathon County, (1931) 205 Wis. 536, 238 N. W.
383.
1OSee sunra, sec. 2.
10 9 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Chenault (1926) 214 Ky. 748, 284 S. W.
397. Conversely where a tract is used as a unit and is divided lv the
railroad right-of-way condemned the landowner cannot claim that benefits
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improvement scheme is to be treated as a unit. All special benefits from the entire improvement are to be considered, 10 but not
benefits derived from other separate improvements.''
The standard of "reasonable certainty" which the courts use
generally in testing claims for damages is used likewise in determining what benefits may be offset. Benefits which are regarded
as speculative or conjectural are disregarded. 1 2 In this latter
class were placed the benefits which a farmer across whose land a
power-line right-of-way was taken might derive from the prospect that he might be permitted by the power company to use the
strip for farm purpose until otherwise needed by the company.'Many types of public improvements, especially those which
are made by cities or improvement districts, such as the widening
of streets and the construction of sewers, are not paid for wholly
from public funds derived from general taxation, but are paid
for, wholly or in part, by money raised by special assessments
levied upon nearby landowners whose property is found to be
specially benefited. If an owner, who is subject to such a special
assessment, is a party to a condemnation proceeding or an independent action for damages, wherein the loss or injury he has
sustained from the improvement is to be ascertained, the usual
practice of deducting benefits would make the owner pay twice
for the same benefits, once under the special assessment, and again
as an offset to his claim for damages. Consequently, an exception is made in such cases, and no deduction is allowed."'
should be separately assessed upon the two parcels. Portland & 0. C. R.
Co. v.0 Sanders (1917) 86 Or. 62, 167 Pac. 564 (7).
" Greenfield v. City of Philadelphia, (1925) 282 Pa. St. 344, 127 Ad.
768 (in street widening, benefits from entire improvement to be considered,
not merely from the part in front of the plaintiff's lot). The same rule
seems to obtain as to special assessments. In re 23rd Street Traffic Way,
(1919) 279 Mo. 249, 214 S. W. 109 (3).
11
1In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Orr, (1917) 200 Ala. 603, 76 So. 961
it was held that in an action for damage to plaintiff's lot, due to the lowering of the grade of the street by the railway company, the benefit from
paving the street could be taken in account, but not the enhancement due
to the erection of a nearby depot, not an integral part of the street improvement.
1121n re Rogers, (1928) 243 Mich. 517, 220 N. W. 808 (11) (speculative 113
enhancement of suburban land from establishment of highway).
Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Beard, (1925) 152
Tenn.114348, 277 S.W. 889 (3).
-Gregg v. Sanders, (1921) 149 Ark. 15. 231 S.W. 190, 17 A. L. R.
59, with note; Driver v. Road Imp. Dist., (1926) 172 Ark. 340. 28 S. W.
711, and comment in (1927) 11 MIxIxEsorA LAW REvmw 565; Young v.
City of Toledo, (1931) 39 Oh. App. 553, 178 N. E. 33. The most exact
solution is that prescribed by the Michigan Highway Act, which requires
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In the application of the doctrine by which the benefits derived by the landowner from the improvement are counted as
part of his compensation for land taken, it results not infrequently
that he may not secure payment at all for the appropriation of his
land. This seems to have been especially resented by the politically dominant rural landowners in the southern and western
states, when railroads in their appropriation of land for rights-ofway were able thus to reduce to a minimum the cost of securing
land. 11 Consequently, we find in a substantial number of state
constitutions provisions which require compensation to be made
without regard to benefits."1 6 Sometimes they are directly aimed
that, where there is an assessment and a condemnation, the amount of the
assessment is to be subtracted from the deduction for benefits, or if the
condemnation comes first, the deduction for benefits is to be credited upon
the assessment. Michigan, Pub. Acts, 1925, Act. No. 352, sec. 18, construed in Board v. Vermander, (1928) 242 Mich. 239, 219 N. W. 74.
Compare Betts v. Williamsburgh, (1853) 15 Barb. (N.Y.) 255 (deduction for benefits credited upon assessment).
115 Some phases of the clash of interest between farmers and railroads
are well described in James Truslow Adams, The Epic of America
298-300.
" 6 Arizona, const. art. II, sec. 17: "No private property shall be taken
or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been
first made, or paid into court for the owner, and no right of way shall be
appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal, until full
compensation therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid
into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement
proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained
by a jury, unless a jury be waived as in other civil cases in courts of
record, in the manner prescribed by law." Arkansas, const. 1874, art. 12,
sec. 9: "No property, nor right of way, shall be appropriated to the use
of any corporation until full compensation therefor shall be first made to
the owner, in money, or first secured to him by a deposit of money, which
compensation, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed
by such corporation, shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men, in a
court of competent jurisdiction, as shall be prescribed by law."; California,
const. (as in force Jan. 1, 1931), art. 1, sec. 14: "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first
been made to, or paid into court for, the owner, and no right of way shall
be appropriated to the use of any corporation, except a municipal corporation or a county or the state until full compensation therefor be first made
in money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of
any benefits from any improvement proposed by such corporation . . .;"
Florida, const. art. XVI, sec. 29: "No private property nor right of way
shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation or individual until full
compensation therefor shall be first made to the owner, or first secured
to him by deposit of money; which compensation, irrespective of any
benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation or individual,
shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men in a court of competent jurisdiction, as shall be prescribed by law;" Iowa, const. of 1857, art. I. sec.
18: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made, or secured to be made to the owner thereof. as
soon as the damages shall be assessed by a jury, who shall not take into
consideration any advantages that may result to said owner on account of
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against railroads in that they apply only to "rights-of-way" taken

by private corporations. 117

In other instances, municipal improve-

ments are expressly exempted.'1 1 In cases to which these provisions apply benefits cannot be set-off either against the value of
the land taken or against the injury to the remaining land.""
Despite the strength of the landowner's contention that land
should be paid for in money and not in benefits, it is difficult to
resist the argument that when we come to measure the injury to
land not taken, we must consider advantages as well as disadvantages resulting from the improvement, as a necessary part of
the improvement for which it is taken."; Kansas, coast. of 1859, art.
XII, sec. 4: "No right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any
corporation, until full compensation therefor be first made in money, or secured by a deposit of money, to the owner, irrespective of any benefit from
any improvement proposed by such corporation."; North Dakota, const..
art. I, sec. 14: "'Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid into
court for the owner, and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use
of any corporation, other than municipal, until full compensation therefor
be first made in money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner.
irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury
be waived."; Ohio, const. (as in force, 1930), art. XIII, sec. 5: "No right
of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation, until full
compensation therefor be first made in money, or first secured by a deposit
of money, to the owner, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement
proposed by such corporation: which compensation shall be ascertained by a
jury of twelve men, in a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law.":
South Carolina, const. 1895, art. IX, sec. 20: "No right of way shall be
appropriated to the use of any corporation until full compensation therefor
shall be first made to the owner or secured by a deposit of money, iirespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation.
which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men, in a
Court of record, as shall be prescribed by law."; South Dakota, const art.
VI, sec. 13: "No benefit which may accrue to the owner as the result of
an improvement made by any private corporation shall be considered in
fixing the compensation for property taken or damaged."; Washington.
const. 1889, art. I,sec. 16; "No private property shall be taken or damaged
for public or private use without just compensation having been first made,
or paid into court for the owner, and no right-of-wvay shall be appropriated
to the use of any corporation other than municipal until full compensation
therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid into court for the
owner, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by
such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury. unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in courts of record, in the
manner prescribed by law."
"TSee supra, n. 116.
1lsSee supra, n. 116.

19 St Louis, I. f.& So. R. Co. v. Theodore Maxfield Co.. (1910)
94 Ark. 135, 126 S.W. 83, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1111; Beveridge v. Lewis,
(1902) 137 Cal. 619, 67 Pac. 1040, 70 Pac. 1083, 59 L. R. A. 581: Gish v.
Castner, W. & A. Drain Dist.. (1908) 137 Iowa 711. 115 N. W. 474:
Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Woodward. (1891) 47 Kan. 191. 27 Pac.
836; Seattle & M. R. Co. v. Roeder, (1902) 30 Wash. 244, 70 Pac. 498 ( 1).
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the process of determining whether any injury results and, if so,
how much. 120 This reasoning has been accepted by a large group
of courts, which are unwilling to use benefits to the full extent of
offsetting them against the value of land actually taken. These
courts take a middle ground, and require that the land owner be
paid full value for any land actually taken, but allow benefits to
be considered in determining the amount of the damage to land
not taken. 12 1 This practice is often prescribed by statutes, which
commonly provide that the value of the land taken, the damages
to land not taken, and the benefits to the latter from the improvements, each be separately assessed by the jury or appraisers, in
their verdict or findings. 122 This enables the judge to make the
deduction for benefits, without leaving it to the jury, and enables
him more effectively to pass upon the acceptability of the jury's
conclusions.
7. TIME FOR ASCERTAINMENT OF COMPENSATION
If the land affected by the condemnation is fluctuating in value
120"The party whose land is taken should certainly be paid in full for
the land actually taken, without regard to any benefits accruing to the
remaining lands; but, when the party seeks to recover for the injury or
damage to the remaining lands, it is difficult to see how it can be said th'at
any damage has been suffered, by reason of the change of grade and
making of the sidewalk, if the net result of that work has been that the
land has been benefited, and not deteriorated, in value. As said by the
supreme court of Illinois: 'A partial effect only is not to be considered. but
the whole effect. .

.

. This is not deducting benefits or advantages from

damages, but is acertaining whether there be damages or not.' " Town of
Eutaw v. Botnick, (1907) 150 Ala. 429, 43 So. 739, 740. In Washington,
where by constitutional provision benefits cannot be offset against damages
in railroad cases, the court permitted the railroad to show benefits not to
offset against damages but "to disprove damages." Murphy v. C. M. &
St. P. R. Co., (1912) 66 Wash. 663, 120 Pac. 525. But see (1927) 2
Wash. L. Rev. 197 n. 25.
12'Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., (1914) 191 Ala. 58, 67
So. 833, Ann. Cas. 1917C 878; Town of Eutaw v. Botnick, (1907) 150
Ala. 429, 43 So. 739; Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Georgia R. Co., (1909) 132
Ga. 537, 64 S. E. 563; Department of Public Works v. McBride, (1930)
338 Il. 347, 170 N. E. 295; Big Sandy R. Co. v. Dils, (1905) 120 Ky. 563.
87 S. W. 310; Omaha So. R. Co. v. Todd, (1894) 39 Neb. 818, 58 N. W.
289 (3). In re New York water front, (1907) 190 N. Y. 358, 83 N. E.
299, 16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 335, 13 Ann. Cas. 598. Guthrie, etc., R. Co. v.
Faulkner, (1903) 12 Okla. 532, 73 Pac. 290 (semble) ; Dulaney v. Nolan
County, (1892) 85 Tex. 225, 20 S. W. 70; Tidewater R. Co. v. Cowan.
(1907) 106 Va. 817, 56 S. E. 819; Buckhannon & N. R. Co. v. Great
Scott Coal & Coke -Co., (1914) 75 W. Va. 423, 83 S. E. 1031 ; Zwictusch v.
East Milwaukee, (1915) 161 Wis. 519, 154 N. W. 981.
2For examples of cases under such statutes, see Sonoma County v.
DeWinton, (1930) 105 Cal. App. 166, 287 Pac. 121 (separate findings required by Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1248, waived by failure to object) ; Denver
N. W. & P. R. ,Co., (1911) 49 Colo. 256, 112 Pac. 779 (9) ; City of
Detroit v. More, (1889) 76 Mich. 515, 43 N. W. 600.
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and the proceedings are not swiftly concluded, the question of the
date of valuation may be important. The usual constitutional provision for "just compensation" has been held to require that the
land taken be valued as of the time of the "taking." 123 At all
events, it would seem that no later time could be chosen, if it
should result in giving the owner less than his land was worth
when taken from him. The time when the land was taken is
usually said to be the time as of which compensation should be
ascertained. 12 4

"Taking" is a term of some latitude, however,

since the whole course of the condemnation proceedings from beginning to end is the taking in a general sense. It has been necessary to fix the time more specifically. This has frequently been
23
1 in Benedict v. City of New York, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1899) 98 Fed.
789 certain land was sought to be taken for an aqueduct. Under the statute.
the condemning authority filed in the record maps showing the owner's
land as part of the area to be taken. This was done in 1896. Two years
later, in 1898, after the land had depreciated in value, appraisers were appointed and took oath, to appraise the land. At this point, it was provided
that title to the land should vest in the public authority. The owner
claimed that the land should be valued as of the time when the maps were
filed, but the claim was denied, and the court said: "The fundamental
doctrine that private property cannot be taken for public uses without just
compensation does not require that the compensation be made in all cases
concurrently in point of time with the actual exercise of the right of
eminent domain; and it is competent for the legislature, in the absence
of any constitutional interdiction, to prescribe whether the compensation
be made at the time of the projection of the work, at the inception of the
condemnation proceeding, at any subsequent stage of the proceeding, or at
the time of taking actual possession of the property for the construction of
the work. But, at whatever time the compensation is to be made or paid,
just compensation entitles the owner to the full market or pecuniary value
of his property at the time of the taking; and the authorities are so generally in accord upon this proposition that it may be accepted as the settled
rule. By some of the statutes the owner is divested of his title or possession, actually or potentially, at the time of the enactment; while by others
this does not occur until the proceeding has arrived at some advanced stage
of progress, or been finally consummated, or until his damages have been
paid. In every case, therefore, the application of the rule depends upon the
provisions of the particular statute in terminating the dominion of tile
owner and segregating the property for the public use. . . . The lands were
taken when the commissioners of appraisal filed their oaths of office. They
were taken at that time because by the terms of section 10 the city then acquired the right to occupy them in perpetuity, subject, of course, to a
condemnation proceeding. Until then the purpose to appropriate them was
merely a tentative one, and the proceeding might never culminate in an actual appropriation. Until then there was no statutory act indicative of a
final intention by the city to acquire lands. It was the contemplation of
the legislature that they should be deemed taken at that time, and compensation awarded with reference to it, because the act provides that from that
time the city shall pay interest upon the amount"
124United State v. Rogers, (1921) 255 U. S. 163, 169, 41 Sup. Ct. 281,
65 L. Ed. 566; Joly v. City of Salem, (1931) 276 Mass. 297, 177 N. E.
121 (6) ; 20 C J. 827.
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done by statute, but more often the courts have had to determine
the particular step in the proceedings which shall be selected as
the date of -valuation.

The "taking" might appropriately be de-

fined as the stage in the proceedings at which the right to immediate possession of the land passes to the condemnor, and this of
course varies with the particular statutes. Among the different
steps in the process which are selected under various condemnation statutes as the time with reference to which compensation
will be made are the following:'12 1 (1) The date of the filing of
'
the petition for condemnation, 121
or of the issuance of the sum27
mons' ' or of the land owner's appearance thereto ;12, (2) The
time of the entry or actual occupation of the land by the con-

demning authority; 2 9 (3) The time of the award by the jury or
appraisers;13° the time of the trial.'
If the land has been occupied wrongfully for a public improvement, without taking the

proper proceedings to condemn it, the landowner has been allowed to recover its value at the time of trial, together with loss
of the value of its use down to the time of trial.' 2 In such cases,
he might well also be given an election to take the value at the
time of the occupation, with interest.' 33

' 25The cases are collected in Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent
Domain, sec. 124.
126Smith v. Jeffcoat, (1916) 196 Ala. 96, 71 So. 717; Road Dist. No.
4 v. Frailey, (1924) 313 Il. 568, 145 N. E. 195; City of New Orleans
v. Moeglich, (1930) 169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675; Acquackanonk Water Co.
v. Weidmann Co., (1923) 99 N. J. L. 175, 122 At. 825; State v. lawk,
(1922) 105 Or. 319, 208 Pac. 709; Stahl v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry. Co., (1919)
262 Pa. St. 493, 106 Atl. 65 (filing of owner's petition for viewers, being
the time
of vesting of title).
127Oregon, W. R. & N. Co. v. Campbell, (1921) 34 Idaho 601, 202
Pac. 1065 (all compensation, including injury to land not taken to be computed as of date of issuance of summons, and damage which could not
then have
been reasonably anticipated is excluded).
126Harrington v. Superior Court, (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 228 Pac. 15
(construing
Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1249).
129North Carolina State Highway Commission v. Young, (1931) 200
N. C. 603, 158 S. E. 91; Board of Commissioners v. Richardson, (1922) 122
S. C. 58, 114 S. E. 632. Where payment or deposit of the money is required before taking possession, the time of payment is sometimes taken.
City of Tulsa v. Horwitz, (1928) 131 Okla. 63, 267 Pac. 852.
13OCity of -Chicago v. Farwell, (1919) 286 Ill. 415, 121 N. E. 795
(under
Illinois, Rev. Stat., Hurd, ch. 24, sec. 524).
' 3 1Mulford v. Farmers' Reservoir & Irrigation Co., (1916) 62 Colo.
167, 161 Pac. 301; Minneapolis Elec. Tr. Co. v. Harkins, (1909) 108 Minn.
478, 122
N. W. 450.
32
L Morin v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., (1882) 30 Minn. 100, 14 N. W. 460;
Texas Western R. Co. v. Cane, (1891) 80 Tex. 137, 15 S. W. 786;
Blankenship
v. State, (1931) 160 Wash. 514, 295 Pac. 480.
" 3 See Fish v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1901) 84 Minn. 179, 87 N. W.
606.
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As to the injuries and benefits to remaining land from con-

struction or operation of the improvement, the time as of which
the net damage will be measured depends on whether the improvement has been constructed at the time of the trial. If it has
not, of course, the best that can be done is to determine from the
plan of construction how much the property will be injured or
benefited. But-it often happens that the improver (with or without
having started condemnation proceedings) has gone ahead with
the construction before the trial of the claim for damages. If so,
the landowner recovers the diminution in value as of the time of
the construction, 34 or if it is still proceeding then the ultimate
134Lexington & E. R. Co. v. Hargis, (1923) 199 Ky. 296, 250 S. %V.
991; Wight v. Belcher, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) 226 S. W. 472, affirmed,
(Tex. Comm. App. 1923) 249 S. W. 453.
13 51n New Jersey, I. & I. R. Co., (1907) 168 Ind. 205, 80 N. E. 420
the railroad company instituted proceedings to condemn a right of way
across a farm, and partially completed its embankment before the trial.
This embankment crossed a drainage ditch, and only an insufficient tile drain
was installed, thus causing the backing up of water upon tle farm. The
court held that while under the Indiana practice all damages are assessed
on the basis of the injuries that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of
the filing of the condemnation complaint, yet it was proper to consider the
actual results of so much of the construction as had been completed at the
time of the trial. So also in In re Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners,
(1909) 197 N. Y. 81, 90 N. E. 456, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 647 it was held
improper to limit the damages of owners of land on a street under which
a subway was being constructed to such injury as wvas apparent or foreseen at the time when title vested in the condemnor by the statute, and that
the damaging effects of the actual later course of construction must be considered. The court (Vann, J.) said: "The rule of evidence adopted by
the commissioners was erroneous. They limited the witnesses in their estimates of value to the time when it was known that the subway was an assured fact by the filing of the oaths, although the work of construction
had not been commenced, and instructed them to exclude from consideration
any physical damage which had actually been inflicted at the time of the
trial, when the work in front of the premises in question had been substantially completed. In estimating the market value on this basis, the experts
were confined to supposition and speculation, for filing a paper in a public
office worked no physical change in the property, and they were not allowed to consider the realities as shown by time and experience. The test
presented to them was what the market value would probably be if an intending purchaser knew that the road was to be built. This left everything
open to the mere estimate of experts, not founded on fact, but on conjecture.
Certainty is better than conjecture, and the injuries actually inflicted a better guide than the opinions of experts as to the market values just before
and just after the oaths of the commissioners were filed, or during the same
five minutes. The value of such evidence, always a dangerous and uncertain guide, and in this case especially so, owing to the restrictions of tie
commissioners, is shown by the fact that experts called by the claimants
estimated the amount of the depreciation of the property just after the oaths
were filed at 50 per cent of its value just before the oaths were filed, while
those called by the city, apparently of equal intelligence and experience,
placed it at 10 per cent."

.MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

permanent damages which are foreseeable at the time of trial in
the light of what has then been done and of the plans for completion. 8 5
8.

INTERESr

The condemnation statutes often specifically provide that interest from a particular time, upon the compensation, shall be included in the award. "Just compensation" doubtless requires that
some protection be extended to the owner against undue delay in
payment, and it has been said to entitle him to interest upon the
Sometimes,
value of land taken from the time of the taking."1
interest is given from the time of the institution of the proceedings,' 1 7 but the more usual result is to give interest on the value of
land taken from the time when the condemnor actually takes
possession.138 If the statute gives interest from an earlier (ate,
the landowner is sometimes required to offset the value of the
3 9
rents and occupation against the interest.1
Courts are divided on the question of whether interest accruing before the award may be given upon the amount assessed, not
for the value of land taken, but for the injury to remaining land.1 40
Where the injury has been inflicted by a structure already comipleted, the allowance of interest upon the damages, that is, upon
the amount determined to be the diminution in value of the remaining land, computed from the date of completion of the structure, seems consonant with equity.
1 6
United States v. Rogers, (1920) 255 U. S. 163, 41 Sup. Ct. 281, 65
L. Ed. 566. See cases collected in Decennial & Current Digests, Eminent
Domain, sec. 148.
137As in Brown v. United States, (1923) 263 -U. S. 78, 44 Sup. Ct. 92,
68 L. Ed. 171 where in a condemnation proceeding on behalf of the United
States for land in New Mexico, it was held that the conformity act required
the court to follow the local statute which allowed interest from the (late
of the summons.
23 sUnited States v. Rogers, (1920) 255 U. S. 163, 41 Sup. Ct. 281. 65
L. Ed. 566; Commercial Station Post Office, Inc. v. ,United States, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 183 (5) ; Town of Stamford v. Vuono, (1928)
108 Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 245 (13) ; Lackawanna Iron & Steel Co. v. Lackawanna & W. V. R. Co., (1930) 299 Pa. St. 503, 149 AtI. 702 (13): 20
C. J. 810 n. 14.
' 39 Pattison v. B. P. & R. Co.. (1920) 268 Pa. St. 555, 112 Ati. 101 (3).
But see Brown v. United States, (1923) 263 U. S. 78, 44 Sup. Ct. 92, 68 L.
Ed. 171.
14 0
1t is allowed in Dallas County v. Barr, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 231
S. W. 453; but denied on the ground that the amount of damage is not a
liquidated sum, in City of Chicago v. S. Obermayer Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1920) 268 Fed. 237.

